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Afterword and Response: What Digging
Does and Does Not Do
PatriciaD. White*
I wish that I could tell you that I had discovered incontrovertible
evidence that Pearl Morris had moved to Alaska and undertaken to become
a salmon fisherwoman. But I tried and I was unable to. So I am going to
have to do something else. I suspect that I was asked to comment on
Professor Welke's paper not because I am an historian, because I am not,
and not because I have any particular insight to offer on either the Morris
case or Plessy, because I do not. But rather because I have long been of the
view that something akin to what we are here calling "legal archaeology" is
a useful tool in understanding cases. For some years, I have required my
first year torts students to engage in what we might call a "dig." So I will
not comment on the details of Professor Welke's paper on which I am fully
prepared to take her word. Rather I will use it as an example in making some
more general points.
Cases arise in context. Any lawyer knows that the full story of a case
which
he or she has worked is not reflected in its judicial opinion. The
on
facts as set forth by the court, for example, are often unrecognizable to
either side. Sometimes they represent elements of the presentations of each
or a compromise of the two. They have likely been pared down, edited as it
were, by the court to reflect its view of relevance. In Morris, for example,
none of the factual detail with which Professor Welke supplied us comes
from the opinion. It all comes from other parts of the record. This is often
the case. Similarly, any lawyer knows that the course and often the outcome
of a case is affected, sometimes indeed determined, by strategic considerations. These include not only the obvious categories encompassed by the
craft of the lawyer: how to use the rules of procedure; the choice of forum
that you might make; what arguments and what cases to rely on; how to
present the case; which witnesses to call; all those sorts of things. But it also
includes less obvious strategic considerations. How, for example, to relate
to opposing counsel; how to juggle your own cases in the context of your
own workload, and the other pressures on you.
Another broad category of influential factors in the actual outcome of
cases might be labeled "the contingencies of the case." These could include
various personal or corporate motivations of the client. Often a lawyer's
choices are driven by the client's temperament, by the client's economic
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commitment or means, by the desire or willingness of the client to
compromise, by the client's ability to understand the case. Appropriately
enough, clients very often will determine or greatly influence the course of
your handling of a case. These features I regard as contingencies, very
important contingencies. None of these is described in the typical appellate
decision or in other written accounts of a case. Professor Welke's description of the railroads' political battle to retain their autonomy fits in a broad
way into the category of a contingency of the case. It affected what the
client was prepared or not prepared to do. This notion of contingency, of
things which might constitute contingencies of a case, might also include a
whole host of characteristics about the judge or about the jury whose fact
finding will importantly bind an appeals court.
Then, too, there may be influences emanating from the social, political,
cultural, and/or economic milieus in which a case sits. The practice of
relying enormously on close analysis of the language of appellate opinions
to teach the law to students necessarily misses much of the contextual
richness of the law. And it doesn't very effectively convey to the student
what it is that lawyers do or what they have to be prepared to contend with
as they go about the business of practicing law. Nor, in my view, does it
give a very complete picture of how the law itself evolved. For this reason,
it has seemed to me make sense as a pedagogical matter to ask first year
students, the ones whose curriculum consists most thoroughly of relatively
contextless appellate opinions, to move backwards to reconstruct as much
of the context of some single opinion as they can. I ask my first year tort
students to choose an appellate decision and then to reconstruct what really
happened in the making of that case. I have them begin by trying to retrieve
the full record. I ask them to find the lower court transcripts. Often, of
course, they discover that the transcripts do not exist or that they are hard
to find. I am indifferent as to whether a student chooses a contemporary case
or a case that happened a long time ago. I ask them to try to retrieve and
read all the briefs at every level. I ask them to find and read any related
social history that they can discover. I ask them, where there are living
lawyers or living participants, to find as many of those lawyers, parties,
witnesses, judges and jurors as possible and interview them. I ask them to
consider going to visit the site where the events occurred and actually to see
what the building looked like or what the geographical configuration was to
see if that was relevant or not relevant. I ask them to look at photos, to read
broadly, to look at contemporaneous news accounts and generally to be as
imaginative as they can be in moving backwards to reconstruct what
happened. To engage first year students in this way is to open their eyes to
some of the interest, excitement, difficulty, power, and reality of legal
practice. It also interestingly humanizes the law for them at a time when
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they are often a little discouraged because they came to law school with a
far different picture of what it would be like from what the first year is
really like.
But this is a pedagogical technique which is justified only because it
is not widespread. That is, the study ofcontext gains pedagogical legitimacy
and importance within the context of the heavy emphasis of the first year
curriculum on relatively contextless appellate opinions. Ours is a legal
system ofrules. Particular cases themselves, often rich in history and driven
by context, are transformed by our system into general rules and as such are
more or less stripped of their content. They become, in a generalized state,
a part of the context in which future cases will arise and be decided, a part
of the context which a lawyer has to look to as he or she takes cases in their
stripped-down sense to apply in the lawyers own legal analysis in the now
current case which he or she has in front of himself or herself. This is, of
course, the central feature of the theoretical basis of the common law.
Understanding how to analyze, generalize, manipulate, and apply rules is the
distinctive job of the lawyer precisely because it is the theoretical centerpiece of our legal system. Teaching students how to think like lawyers must
be the principal pedagogical mission of the first year of law school. The
kind of thing which I do in encouraging students to do legal archaeology in
the sense that I ask them to, is, I think, only justified because it is not done
by their other teachers. If everyone were doing it we would together be
failing in our mission, which is to teach them how to operate as lawyers in
a context of general rules. I think it is very important that we keep that in
mind.
Similarly, as a scholarly enterprise, I think it is important to focus on
what legal archaeology properly is and what it properly is not. In my view,
legal archaeology is properly atheoretical. Its findings help us explain cases.
Its findings help us describe cases. They help us understand what happened.
They give us enormous insight about ourselves and about our society. As
Parker aptly said at the outset, it teaches us about our institutional blind
spots and it gives us both diagnostic tools and suggestions for remediation.
But that is all. I think it is very important to understand that that is what we
are doing when we are doing legal archaeology as scholars.
Professor Welke's fascinating account of Morris is in my view an
example of the sort of insight that we can gain. I think that is what it should
be taken for.

